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Abstract. In a range test, one party holds a ciphertext and needs to
test whether the message encrypted in the ciphertext is within a certain
interval range. In this paper, a range test protocol is proposed, where
the party holding the ciphertext asks another party holding the private
key of the encryption algorithm to help him. These two parties run the
protocol to implement the test. The test returns TRUE if and only if
the encrypted message is within the certain interval range. If the two
parties do not conspire, no information about the encrypted message is
revealed from the test except what can be deduced from the test result.
Advantages of the new protocol over the existing related techniques are
that it achieves correctness, soundness, flexibility, high efficiency and
privacy simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
In a range test, one party (the tester) holds a ciphertext and needs to test
whether the message encrypted in the ciphertext is within a certain interval
range. This test is frequently required in cryptographic applications like e-auction
[8], electronic voting [11], electronic finance [4], group signature [3], publicly ver-
ifiable secret sharing [7] and verifiable encryption [1]. Four properties are desired
in a range test. Correctness: If the encrypted message is in the interval range,
the test outputs TRUE. Soundness: If the test outputs TRUE, the encrypted
message is in the interval range. Privacy: No information about the encrypted
message is revealed except what can be deduced from the test result. Flexibility:
The limitation on the range size, encryption format and participants should be
as little as possible.
The simplest way to implement a range test is using multiple equality tests
linked by “OR” logic without revealing which number in the range equals the
encrypted message. Currently, there are two methods (called naive range test
in this paper) to implement this idea: zero knowledge proof of “OR” logic by
Cramer et al [5] or the verification technique called zero test [10]. These two
methods can be flexibly employed so that various ranges (e.g. ranges with very
large size), participant models (with or without prover) and encryption formats
(even commitment formats) can be used. Although naive range test can be flex-
ible, correct, sound and private, it is very inefficient as its cost is linear in the
size of the range. If the ciphertext to test is encrypted in some special encryp-
tion format (e.g. encrypted bit by bit), cost of naive range test can be reduced
to be linear in the logarithm of the range size. However, ciphertext in practical
cryptographic applications (especially when secure computation of ciphertext
is needed) cannot be often encrypted in special encryption format. So for the
sake of flexibility, naive range test generally needs a cost linear in the size of
the range. Even if the special encryption format can be employed to improve
efficiency, naive range test is still too inefficient.
Some cryptographic techniques [1, 2, 7, 4] are related to range test. They prove
that a committed message is within a certain interval range and are called RPC
(range proof of commitment) schemes in this paper. In RPC schemes, a prover
with the knowledge of the committed message is needed to give a zero knowledge
proof that the message is in the certain interval range. Although RPC schemes
are efficient as their cost is independent of the size of the range, they have some
drawbacks. Firstly, in many applications like e-auction and e-voting, encrypted
messages instead of committed messages are required to be tested. So RPC
schemes (especially [2], which requires a certain commitment format) cannot
be employed in these applications. Secondly, the message to be tested may be
generated by multiple parties and unknown to anybody. For example, in the kth-
bid auction [8], the seller has to test whether the number of bids at a price is less
than k without revealing the bids. As no single bidder knows the sum, nobody
can provide any proof to implement the test. In another example, e-banking,
it is required to test whether a sum of money is below a threshold without
revealing it while nobody knows the sum as it accumulates multiple dealings.
So a prover is not always available. Thirdly, most RPC schemes [1, 7, 4] cannot
guarantee correctness and soundness at the same time. The only correct and
sound scheme among them is Boudot [2], which is only asymptotically (instead
of absolutely) sound. Finally, all the known RPC schemes can work only when
the range to test is many magnitudes smaller than the size of the message space
of the commitment algorithm. In theory, solution to the millionaire problem and
solution to range test can be reduced to each other. However, the existing solution
to the millionaire problem [12, 10] are either inefficient [10] or not completely
private [12].
As the drawbacks of RPC schemes and millionaire problem schemes limit
their application, a range test protocol is proposed in this paper, which is much
more efficient than naive range test and overcomes the drawbacks of the RPC
schemes. In the new range test protocol, two parties are involved: a tester and a
(decryption) authority, who can be acted by multiple entities through a thresh-
old key sharing mechanism. The tester holds the ciphertext to test. The private
key to decrypt the ciphertext is held by the authority. So the tester asks the
authority for help and they run the protocol to implement the test. If the en-
crypted message is in the certain interval range, the protocol outputs TRUE. If
the encrypted message is not in the certain interval range, the protocol outputs
FALSE. Namely, the new test protocol is correct and sound. If the two parties
do not conspire, no information about the encrypted message is revealed from
the test except what can be deduced from the test result. The new protocol is
flexible as it accepts ranges of the same magnitude as the size of the message
space of the encryption algorithm and does not need any prover with knowledge
of the encrypted message. The new protocol is efficient as its computational cost
is independent of the range size. This new protocol can overcome the drawbacks
of RPC schemes. In the example of kth-bid auction, the seller acts as the tester
while an auctioneer acts as the authority to help the seller to determine whether
the number of bids at a price is over k without revealing the bids or the number.
In the example of e-banking, two servers (neither knowing the sum of the money)
act as the tester and authority to test the range of the sum. If the two servers
do not conspire, the sum is not revealed.
In this paper secuirty is analysed in the negatively-malicious model: the ad-
versary does not deviate from the protocol in his attack. The structure of this
paper is as follows. Parameters and symbols to be used in the paper are defined
in Section 2. In Section 3, a building block, specialized zero test, is designed.
In Section 4, two range test protocols are proposed. They are not independent.
Instead, the second protocol is an optimization of the first one.
2 Preliminary Work
Parameters, symbols and encryption systems to be used later are described in
this section. Two additive homomorphic semantically-secure encryption systems3
(e.g. modified ElGamal encryption [6]) are needed in this paper. They are called
the first encryption system and the second encryption system respectively later
in this paper. The ciphertext to test is encrypted in the first encryption system,
while the tester holds the ciphertext and the authority holds the private key of
the first encryption system. To implement the range test, a second encryption
system is set up and its private key is also held by the authority. The public
keys of both encryption systems are public, so that both the authority and the
tester can use both encryption systems for encryption. The message spaces of
the two encryption systems are Zp1 and Zp2 respectively. It is required in this
paper that p2 ≥ 3p1 and p2 is a prime.
Although any additive homomorphic semantically-secure encryption algo-
rithm like Paillier encryption [9] can be employed, for simplicity the modified
ElGamal encryption [6] is employed in both encryption systems in this paper.
In this manner, p1 and p2 are both large prime numbers. Details about the two
(modified ElGamal) encryption systems are as follows.
3 An encryption algorithm with message space Zp and decryption function D() is
additive homomorphic if D(c1) + D(c2) = D(c1c2) mod p for any ciphertexts c1
and c2. An encryption algorithm is semantically-secure if given a ciphertext c, two
messages m1, m2 and querry to the encryption function, such that c = E(mi) where
i = 1 or 2, there is no polynomial algorithm to find out i.
– Multiplication in the two encryption systems are computed with modulus p′1
and p′2 respectively.
– < g1 > and < g2 > are cyclic subgroups of Z
∗
p′
1
and Z∗
p′
2
respectively with
generator g1 and g2, which have prime order p1 and p2 respectively.
– The message space in the two encryption systems are Zp1 and Zp2 respec-
tively.
– x1 ∈ Zp1 and x2 ∈ Zp2 are private keys of the two encryption systems re-
spectively. (g1, y1) and (g2, y2) are public keys of the two encryption systems
respectively where y1 = g
x1
1 mod p
′
1 and y2 = g
x2
2 mod p
′
2.
– E1(m) and E2(m) stand for encryption of message m in the two encryption
systems respectively: (gr1 mod p
′
1, g
m
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r
1 mod p
′
1) or (g
r
2 mod p
′
2, g
m
2 y
r
2 mod
p′2) where r is randomly chosen from Zp1 or Zp2 .
– The product of two ciphertexts c1 = (a1, b1) and c2 = (a2, b2) in the two
encryption systems is (a1a2, b1b2). Inversion of a ciphertext c = (a, b) is
(a−1, b−1). With multiplication and inversion defined, definition of exponen-
tiation and division is automatically obtained.
– D1(c) and D2(c), decryption function of ciphertext c = (a, b) in the two
encryption systems respectively, is logg1 b/a
x1 and logg1 b/a
x1 respectively.
Although normally decryption in the modified ElGamal encryption algo-
rithm needs a search of logarithm and is not efficient, it is only required
to test whether the message is zero or not in any decryption in this paper,
which does not need any logarithm search and is very efficient.
Later in this paper, encryption, decryption, ciphertext multiplication, cipher-
text inversion and ciphertext exponentiations are computed as described here in
this section. The other symbols to be used in this paper are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Symbols
a%b outputs an integer c smaller than b such that a = c mod b
|a| the absolute value of an integer a
[S] the size of a set S(
a
b
)
the number of possible choices of b elements from a candidate elements
3 A Building Block — Specialized Zero Test
Zero test is a technique to test whether there is at least one null ciphertext
(encryption of zero) among multiple ciphertexts. A zero test must be private,
namely nothing about the messages encrypted in the ciphertexts can be deduced
from the test except whether there is at least one null ciphertext among them.
The existing zero test technique (e.g. the so-called complex zero test in [10])
cannot obtain complete privacy as it may reveal some information about the
number of null ciphertexts. Fortunately, in this paper it is only desired to test
whether there is one null ciphertext among multiple ciphertexts where there is at
most one null ciphertext among them. This will be accomplished by modifying
the zero test technique from [10] into a new cryptographic primitive: specialized
zero test, which can achieve complete privacy in the application in this paper.
A specialized zero test examines whether there is one null ciphertext among
multiple ciphertexts encrypted using the second encryption system described in
Section 2 where there is at most one null ciphertext among them. While the
zero test technique in [10] is a multiparty protocol, only two parties are involved
in the specialized zero test in this paper: a tester A1 and an authority A2. A1
holds ciphertexts c1, c2, . . . , cn in the second encryption system where there is
at most one null ciphertext among them. A2 holds the private key of the second
encryption system. In the specialized zero test A2 assists A1 to test whether
there is one null ciphertext among c1, c2, . . . , cn. Three properties are desired in
specialized zero test.
– Correctness: if there is one null ciphertext in c1, c2, . . . , cn, the test result is
TRUE.
– Soundness: if the test result is TRUE, there is one null ciphertext in
c1, c2, . . . , cn.
– Privacy: after the test, each party learns only the test result and what can
be deduced from it, as long as the authority and the tester do not collude.
The test protocol is denoted as ZM(A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn) and described in
Figure 1.
1. A1 chooses pi(), a permutation on {1, 2, . . . , n}, and random integers ri from
Zp2 − {0} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then he calculates c
′
i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. He
sends c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n to A2.
2. A2 calculates di = D2(c
′
i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n one by one until one di is found to
be zero or all the n ciphertexts are decrypted. A2 publishes the output of the
zero test as follows.
ZM(A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn) =
{
TRUE if zero found in di
FALSE if no zero in di
(1)
Fig. 1. Specialized zero test
Theorem 1. The specialized zero test is correct in the negatively-malicious
model. More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and there is one
zero encrypted in c1, c2, . . . , cn, then ZM(A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn) = TRUE.
Proof: As c′i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and the encryption algorithm is additive
homomorphic, D2(c
′
i) = D2(c
ri
pi(i)) = riD2(cpi(i)) mod p2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Suppose D2(cj) = 0 where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then D2(c
′
pi−1(j)) = rpi−1(j) × D2(cj) =
rpi−1(j)×0 mod p2 = 0. So there is at least one zero inD2(c
′
1), D2(c
′
2), . . . , D2(c
′
n).
Therefore, ZM(A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn) = TRUE. 2
Theorem 2. The specialized zero test is sound in the negatively-
malicious model. More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and
ZM(A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn) = TRUE, then there is at least one null ciphertext
in c1, c2, . . . , cn.
Proof: As c′i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and the encryption algorithm is additive
homomorphic, D2(c
′
i) = D2(c
ri
pi(i)) = riD2(cpi(i)) mod p2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. As
ZM(A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cm) = TRUE, there is at least one zero encrypted in
c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n. Suppose D2(c
′
j) = 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then rjD2(cpi(j)) = 0 mod p2.
As p2 is a prime and rj is chosen from Zp2 − {0}, D2(cpi(j)) = 0. Therefore,
there is at least one null ciphertext in c1, c2, . . . , cn. 2
Theorem 3. The specialized zero test is private. More precisely, if A1
and A2 do not collude, the only knowledge of either of them about
D2(c1), D2(c2), . . . , D2(cn) is the test result.
Proof: As A1 has no knowledge of the private key and the encryption algo-
rithm is semantically-secure, nothing about D2(c1), D2(c2), . . . , D2(cn) is re-
vealed to him if A2 does not help to decrypt any message. As A2 does not
collude with A1, A2 only tells A1 the test result, which is A1’s only knowledge
about D2(c1), D2(c2), . . . , D2(cn).
Although A2 has the private key, his knowledge is limited by the ciphertexts
sent to him. As A1 does not collude with him, only c
′
1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n are sent
to A2. So his only knowledge from the test is D2(c
′
1)||D2(c
′
2)|| . . . ||D2(c
′
n),
which is called his knowledge transcript. Suppose T1 and T2 are two knowledge
transcripts from two inputs with the same test result. Note that c′i = c
ri
pi(i), p2 is
a prime and ri is randomly chosen from Zp2 − {0} as A1 does not collude with
A2. So D2(c
′
i) is distributed uniformly in Zp2−{0} if D2(cpi(i)) 6= 0 or D2(c
′
i) = 0
if D2(cpi(i)) = 0. So if A1 does not collude with A2, when the test result is TRUE,
both T1 and T2 are uniformly distributed in { T | T ∈ {Zp2}
n, T contains one 0};
when the test result is FALSE, both T1 and T2 are uniformly distributed in
(Zp2 −{0})
n. As A2’s knowledge transcripts from any two inputs with the same
test result are indistinguishable from each other without A1’s collusion, no
information about the input is revealed to A2 except for the test result without
A1’s collusion. 2
4 The New Range Test Protocol
In the new range test protocol, given a ciphertext c encrypted in the first en-
cryption system described in Section 2, the tester runs a two-party protocol with
the authority to examine whether D1(c) is in a certain interval range without
knowing or revealing D1(c). In this protocol there is a limitation about the range
size: no more than p1/5, which is of the same magnitude as the size of the mes-
sage space. As p1 is very large (e.g. 1024 bits long) in any practical encryption
algorithm, the range is large enough for normal applications. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the range involved in the test is Zq where 5q ≤ p1. Note that range
test in any consecutive integer range in the message space with a size no more
than p1/5 can be easily reduced to a range test in a same-size range starting from
zero due to homomorphism of the encryption algorithm. Two range test protocols
are designed in this section based on a principle:m ∈ Zq if and only ifm%q = m,
which can be tested by reducing it to multiple simpler tests and repeatedly ex-
ploiting homomorphism of the employed encryption algorithms. Firstly, a correct
but only partially sound test protocol in the negatively-malicious model — ba-
sic range test — is described. Then a correct and sound test protocol in the
negatively-malicious model, called precise range test, is designed based on two
basic range tests.
4.1 Basic Range Test
The basic range test is an interactive protocol between two parties: the tester
and the authority. The tester is denoted as A1, who possesses a ciphertext c in
the first encryption system. The authority is denoted as A2, who possesses the
private keys of the two encryption systems. The basic range test protocol includes
three steps. In the first step, m, the message encrypted in c is randomly shared
between A1 and A2. Namely, A1 holds random integer m1, A2 holds random
integer m2 such that m = m1 + m2 mod p1. In the second step, A2 transmits
E2(m2) and E2(m2%q) to A1. In the third step, A1 and A2 perform a specialized
zero test, during which A1 provides some randomised and shuffled ciphertexts
and A2 decrypts them. The basic range test is denoted as BR ( A1, A2 | c ) and
described in Figure 2, such that
BR ( A1, A2 | c ) =
{
TRUE if (3) = TRUE
FALSE if (3) = FALSE
Theorem 4. The basic range test is correct in the negatively-malicious model.
More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, the
specialized zero test in Formula (3) outputs TRUE.
Proof: Suppose D1(c) = m. As 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, m%q = m. There are two
important facts.
– As c = c1c2, m = m1 + m2 mod p1. So, either (1): m = m1 + m2 or (2):
m = m1 +m2 − p1.
– It is always true that either (a): (m1 + m2)%q = m1%q + m2%q or (b):
(m1 +m2)%q = m1%q +m2%q − q.
So the proof is given in four different cases by combining the two possibilities in
the first fact, (1) and (2), with the two possibilities in the second fact, (a) and
(b): (1a), (1b), (2a) and (2b).
1. A1 randomly chooses m1 from Zp1 . He calculates c1 = E1(m1) and sends c2 =
c/c1 to A2.
2. (a) A2 calculates m2 = D1(c2).
(b) A2 calculates c
′
2 = E2(m2) and e2 = E2(m2%q) and sends them to A1.
3. (a) A1 calculates c
′
1 = E2(m1) and e1 = E2(m1%q).
(b) A1 needs to perform the following logic test with the help of A2:
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0 ∨ (2)
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0 ∨
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
In logic expression (2), either all the five clauses are false or only one of them
is true. So the logic test of (2) can be implemented through a specialized zero
test:
ZM(A1, A2 | e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) (3)
Fig. 2. Basic range test
– (1a): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = D2(e1e2/(E2(m1)E2(m2))) = D2(e1) +D2(e2)−
(D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2)) mod p2 = m1%q +m2%q − (m1 +m2) mod p2
According to Condition (1) and Condition (a),
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = (m1 +m2)%q −m mod p2 = m%q −m mod p2 = 0
– similarly to the cases of (1a), in the cases of (1b), (2a) and (2b),
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0 or D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0 or
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
In summary, it is always true that
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0 ∨
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0
∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
As ZM() is correct according to Theorem 1,
ZM(A1, A2 | e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = TRUE
2
Lemma 1. If
∑n
i=1(−1)
mixi = 0 mod p and
∑n
i=1 |xi| < p where mi = 0 or 1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then
∑n
i=1(−1)
mixi = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1 is very simple and is not presented due to space limitation.
Theorem 5. The basic range test is partially sound in the negatively-malicious
model. More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and the specialized
zero test in Formula (3) outputs TRUE, then 0 ≤ D1(c) < 3q.
Proof: As ZM() is sound according to Theorem 2
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0 ∨
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0
∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
when
ZM(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = TRUE
In the following proof m1%q+m2%q is calculated with the help of homomorphic
property m1%q +m2%q = D2(e1) +D2(e2) = D2(e1e2) mod p2 and under the
condition of every clause in Equation (4). Each clause corresponds to a case in
the proof, while each case is divided into two sub-cases: either m = m1 +m2 or
m = m1 +m2 − p1.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0, then D2(e1e2) = D2(c
′
1c
′
2) = D2(E2(m1)E2(m2)) =
m1 +m2 mod p2.
• If m = m1 +m2, then
m1%q +m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1 +m2 mod p2 = m mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+|m2%q|+|m| < 2q+p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1 and p2 ≥ 3p1.
So according to Lemma 1, m1%q +m2%q = m. Therefore, m < 2q.
• If m = m1 +m2 − p1, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2 mod p2 = m+ p1 mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1| < 2q+ 2p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1 and
p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q + m2%q = m + p1, which
is impossible as m1%q + m2%q < 2q < p1 < m + p1. Therefore, it is
impossible that m = m1 +m2 − p1 when D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0.
So, m < 2q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0, it can be similarly proved that m < q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0, it can be similarly proved that m < 2q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q− q))) = 0, it can be similarly proved that m < 3q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0, it can be similarly proved that m < q.
In summary, it is always true that m < 3q. 2
Theorem 6. The basic range test is private. More precisely, if A1 and A2 do
not collude, the only knowledge of either of them about D1(c) is the test result.
Proof: A1’s total knowledge from the basic range test about D1(c) is the test
result as the employed encryption algorithms are semantically secure and only
A2 knows the private key. So A1’s only knowledge about D1(c) in the basic range
test is the test result if A2 does not collude with him.
Without A1’s collusion, A2’s total knowledge about D1(c) is m2 and T ,
which is his knowledge transcript in the special zero test. So A2’s knowledge
transcript in the basic range test is m2||T . Theorem 3 illustrates that T reveals
no information except for the test result if A1 does not collude with A2. If A1
does not collude with A2, m2 is uniformly distributed in Zp1 and independent
of D1(c) or T . So A2’s knowledge transcript in the basic range test reveals no
information about D1(c) except for the range test result if A1 does not collude
with him. Therefore, without A1’s collusion, A2’s only knowledge about D1(c)
in the basic range test is the test result. 2
The largest size of the range in the basic range test, q, is of the same magni-
tude as p1. The basic range test is efficient and has a constant cost independent
of the range size.
4.2 Precise Range Test
As partial soundness limits the application of the basic range test, it is upgraded
to precise range test, which is absolutely sound. More precisely, precise range
test outputs TRUE if and only if the encrypted message is in the range. The
precise range test of a ciphertext c in the first encryption system is denoted as
PR ( A1, A2 | c ), such that PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ D1(c) < q. The
precise range test of c is described in Figure 3, in which PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE
guarantees 0 ≤ D1(c) < 3q while BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q−1)/c ) = TRUE guarantees
D1(c) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} ∪ {p1 − 2q + 1, p1 − 2q + 2, . . . , p1}. The intersection of
the two ranges is Zq.
1. A1 prepares two basic range tests BR ( A1, A2 | c ) and BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q −
1)/c ).
2. A1 presents the two basic range tests to A2 in a random order.
3. A2 finishes the two basic range tests and tells A1 whether both basic range tests
output TRUE and no more information.
4.
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) =
{
TRUE if BR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE and
BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q − 1)/c ) = TRUE
FALSE otherwise
(4)
Fig. 3. Precise range test
Theorem 7. The precise range test is correct in the negatively-malicious model.
More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, then
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE.
Proof: As 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, according to Theorem 4, BR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE.
As 0 ≤ D1(c) < q and the encryption algorithm is additive homomor-
phic, D1(E1(q − 1)/c) = q − 1 − D1(c) < q. So according to Theorem 4,
BR ( A1, A2 | (E1(q − 1)/c ) = TRUE. Therefore, PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE.
2
Theorem 8. The precise range test is absolutely sound in the negatively-
malicious model. More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE, then 0 ≤ D1(c) < q.
Proof: BR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE and BR ( A1, A2 | (E1(q − 1)/c ) = TRUE
as PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE. So, according to Theorem 5 and addi-
tive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm, 0 ≤ D1(c) < 3q and
(q − 1−D1(c))%p1 = D1(E1(q − 1)/c) < 3q. The fact (q − 1−D1(c))%p1 < 3q
implies 0 ≤ D1(c) < q or D1(c) > p1 − 2q. As 5q ≤ p1, the fact D1(c) > p1 − 2q
implies D1(c) ≥ 3q. Therefore, D1(c) < 3q ∧ (D1(c) < q ∨ D1(c) ≥ 3q).
Namely, 0 ≤ D1(c) < q. 2
As the employed encryption algorithms are semantically secure and A1 knows
no private key, his total knowledge about D1(c) is the test result if A2 does not
collude with him. So the precise range test is private to A1. More precisely, if
A2 does not collude with A1, A1’s only knowledge about D1(c) is the test result.
Note that the precise range test only employs two basic range tests, so it is not
completely private to A2. According to Theorem 6, A2’s only knowledge in the
precise range test are the results of the two basic range tests if A1 does not collude
with him. When the precise range test outputs TRUE, A2’s only knowledge is the
result of the precise range test without A1’s collusion as the precise range test
outputs TRUE if and only if both basic range tests output TRUE. However, when
the precise range test outputs FALSE, A2 knows whether −2q < D1(c) < 3q. If
one basic range test outputs FALSE and the other outputs TRUE, A2 knows that
−2q < D1(c) < 3q. Otherwise, A2 knows that 3q ≤ D1(c) ≤ p1−2q. So, complete
privacy is sacrificed in the precise range test to achieve absolute soundness in
the negatively-malicious model.
The largest size of the range in the precise range test, q, is of the same
magnitude as p1. The precise range test is efficient and has a constant cost
independent of the range size.
5 Conclusion
A range test protocol is proposed, which can correctly and soundly test whether
a ciphertext contains a message in a certain interval range without revealing
the message. If the tester wants, he can get the correct test result with an
overwhelmingly large probability. Unlike the existing related techniques, the new
protocol is efficient, accepts large enough range size and does not need a prover
with knowledge of the message. If privacy is desired in the actively-malicious
model, cut-and-choose mechanism can be employed to satisfy it.
A Acknowledgement
The research in this paper was supported by a research grant from NICT, Japan.
References
1. Feng Bao. An efficient verifiable encryption scheme for encryption of discrete
logarithms. In the Smart Card Research Conference, CARDIS’98, volume 1820 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 213–220, Berlin, 1998. Springer-Verlag.
2. Fabrice Boudot. Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval.
In EUROCRYPT ’00, volume 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
431–444, Berlin, 2000. Springer-Verlag.
3. J Camenisch and M Michels. Separability and efficiency for generic group signa-
ture schemes. In CRYPTO ’99, volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 413–430, Berlin, 1999. Springer-Verlag.
4. A Chan, Y Frankel, and Y Tsiounis. Easy come - easy go divisible cash. 1998.
Available as http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/yiannis/.
5. R. Cramer, I. B. Damg˚ard, and B. Schoenmakers. Proofs of partial knowledge
and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In CRYPTO ’94, volume 839 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 174–187, Berlin, 1994. Springer-Verlag.
6. Byoungcheon Lee and Kwangjo Kim. Receipt-free electronic voting scheme with a
tamper-resistant randomizer. In ICISC 2002, pages 389–406, 2002.
7. Wenbo Mao. Guaranteed correct sharing of integer factorization with off-line share-
holders. In PKC 1998, volume 1431 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
27–42, Berlin, 1998. Springer.
8. Kazumasa Omote and Atsuko Miyaji. A second-price sealed-bid auction with the
discriminant of the p-th root. In Financial Cryptography 2002, volume 2357 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 57–71, Berlin, 2002. Springer.
9. P Paillier. Public key cryptosystem based on composite degree residuosity classes.
In EUROCRYPT ’99, volume 1592 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
223–238, Berlin, 1999. Springer-Verlag.
10. Kun Peng, Colin Boyd, Ed Dawson, and Byoungcheon Lee. An efficient and veri-
fiable solution to the millionaire problem. In ICISC 2004, volume 3506 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 315–330, Berlin, 2004. Springer-Verlag.
11. Kun Peng, Colin Boyd, Ed Dawson, and Byoungcheon Lee. Multiplicative ho-
momorphic e-voting. In INDOCRYPT 2004, volume 3348 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 61–72, Berlin, 2004. Springer-Verlag.
12. Kun Peng, Colin Boyd, Ed Dawson, and Byoungcheon Lee. Ciphertext comparison,
a new solution to the millionaire problem. In ICICS 2005, volume 3783 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 84–96, Berlin, 2005. Springer-Verlag.
